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I’m struggling to understand how probabilities other than strictly 50/50 can arise in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics when the wavefunction appears to split into exactly two worlds during measurement.

For example, consider measuring the spin of an electron in the state $|\psi\rangle = a |\text{up}\rangle + b |\text{down}\rangle$. According to the MWI, instead of the wavefunction collapsing during measurement, decoherence causes it to split into two components (worlds). In one world, the experimenter observes spin up, and in the other, spin down.

Here’s my confusion:

  • If only two worlds are created, why isn’t the probability of being in each world exactly 50%?
  • Alternatively, does the Born rule imply that a vast number of worlds are created, with $|a|^2$ of them corresponding to spin up and $|b|^2$ corresponding to spin down? This frequentist-like approach, involving many worlds rather than just two, seems easier to reconcile with the Born rule, but I’m not sure if it’s a valid interpretation within MWI.

Could someone clarify how the Born rule emerges in MWI, especially if only two worlds are involved? Is the idea of “worlds” more nuanced than just a strict count of two?

David
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The MWI is what you get if you take seriously the idea that the equations of motion of quantum theory describe reality.

In classical physics the evolution of a physical quantity, such as the $x$ position of a particle is described by a variable $x(t)$ and if you measure the $x$ position you get the value $x(t)$.

In quantum physics the equations of motion of a physical quantity like the $x$ position are written in terms of a Hermitian operator called an observable $\hat{X}(t)$. The possible results of measuring the $x$ position are given by the eigenvalues of $\hat{X}(t)$ and quantum physics predicts the expectation value $\langle\hat{X}(t)\rangle$ using the relative state $\rho$ which is a Hermitian operator with unit trace according to the Born rule: $$\langle\hat{X}(t)\rangle=\operatorname{tr}(\rho\hat{X}(t))$$

In quantum theory in general the expectation value of an observable at the end of an experiment depends on what happens to all of the possible values of an observable during the experiment: this is called interference. For an example see Section 2 of this paper

https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9911150

If information is copied out of a system this suppresses interference: an effect called decoherence

https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.06282

For systems you see in everyday life, information is copied out of them on a timescale much shorter than the timescale over which they change significantly so interference is very heavily suppressed. As a result, there are multiple versions of those systems with different values of the monitored observables that evolve autonomously and they form layers each of which evolves approximately like the universe as described by classical physics:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.2189

https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0104033

If you measure the $\hat{Z}$ observable of a system $S$ in the state $$a|\uparrow_z\rangle_S+b|\downarrow_z\rangle_S$$ onto a measuring device $M$ the resulting state looks like this $$a|\uparrow_z\rangle_S|\uparrow_z\rangle_M+b|\downarrow_z\rangle_S|\downarrow_z\rangle_M$$

One question to ask is how do you expect probabilities to act in reality. You can then look at what quantities actually act as you expect probabilities to act. The probabilities have to respect what information it's possible for you to get out of the system and it has to respect the symmetries of the resulting state. One approach to explaining the Born rule along such lines is called envariance:

https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0405161

There are other restrictions you can place on probabilities, like a later measurement can't change the probabilities of results of an earlier measurement. For example, if you measure the state $$\tfrac{1}{\sqrt{3}}|\uparrow_z\rangle_S+\sqrt{\tfrac{2}{3}}|\downarrow_z\rangle_S$$ the equal probability rule you propose would lead you to say the probability of $\uparrow_z$ is 1/2. But suppose you follow up this measurement by saying that if you get the $\downarrow_z$ you will measure the $\hat{X}$ observable which is unsharp when $\hat{Z}$ is sharp so that now there are three outcomes of the resulting overall measurement. Then the equal probability rule would say the probability of $\uparrow_z$ is 1/3 not 1/2. There is an approach to probability in the MWI where you ask how you could assign probabilities to stop inconsistencies like that from being used to construct a Dutch Book against you and that leads to the Born rule, see

https://arxiv.org/abs/0906.2718

In either case working out probabilities involves using more structure than just the number of worlds.

alanf
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The idea of mapping states in a superposition to worlds isn't consistent. Let's say you're in the state

$$|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(|\text{up}\rangle_z+|\text{down}\rangle_z\right)$$

in the $z$ basis. If you change your basis to measuring the $x$ direction of spin, the same state reads $$|\psi \rangle = |\text{up}\rangle_x$$

So is there one world or two? And do those "worlds" contain $x$ eigenstates or $z$ eigenstates or something else? There is a very clear contradiction here.

There has been work in trying to derive a preferred basis (Schlosshauer: Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition), but I think in general it does not work. For example, if you try to use a measurement apparatus that measures the sum of spins of two particles, there are still multiple eigenstates of individual spins that are consistent with a given measurement result like total spin $=0$.

My personal understanding is that MWI is more of a way of thinking about things, which sort of works some of the time but gets you into trouble if taken literally. However many (or most?) people who speak of it don't communicate it with the inconsistencies that it comes with. There is another, IMO more damning inconsistency in MWI involving 2 or more measurements on the same system, but the one here is already sufficient to raise serious doubts.

I don't know if you can tell, but I haven't been convinced that MWI is worth taking very seriously.