Can approval of a crime after the fact make one an accomplice?

Question

Example 1:

A thief anticipates that the fence will buy stolen merchandise, as he did many times before. If not for the expectation that the items could be sold the thief wouldn't steal. Is the fence an accomplice of the theft?

Example 2:

A kiddy porn producer anticipates that his new movie will find audience because the previous ones did. Without that anticipation he wouldn't make it. He shares the movie with a like-minded person who praises it, as expected. Is the viewer an accomplice of the abuse?

Example 3:

A terrorist anticipates that the murders he is perpetrating will find approval within a certain audience, and that approval would further his goals. The expectation is justified because of the prior approvals. Without the anticipated approval he wouldn't commit the murders. The audience cheers, as expected, and that does indeed further the terrorist's goals. Are the members of the audience accomplices of the murders?

Please don't treat these examples as three separate questions; they are just illustrations. The question is a generalization of all of that: "Can approval of a crime after it has occurred make one an accomplice?"

Answer 1

Can a fulfilled justified anticipated approval of a crime make one an accomplice?

No.

None of the fact patterns in the question make someone an accomplice. A reasonable belief that someone will act in the future as they have in the past in not sufficient. You have to actually do something (called an actus reus) to commit a crime. A mere propensity to a commit a crime in the future is not itself a crime.

Receiving stolen property is a separate crime, when it happens. Consuming child pornography is a separate crime, when it happens.

Being pleased that someone was murdered is not a crime, even when it does happen.

But none of those examples make the person that the criminal anticipates doing business with or receiving approval from in the future an accomplice.

You can be guilty of a crime for asking someone to commit it: a fencing asking a thief to steal something, a child porn consumer commissioning a child pornography film, or someone asking to have someone murdered. This is called "solicitation". But the mere possibility that they might be receptive to criminal actions taken without any interaction with them lacks an actus reus and isn't a crime of any kind.

Solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt are all what is called "inchoate crimes", because the person committing them does not personally commit a completed crime. But, even inchoate crimes require some actus reus.

One of the most famous fictional explorations of this bedrock principle of criminal law is the 2002 film Minority Report, which is loosely based on Philip K. Dick's 1956 novella entitled The Minority Report.

Answer 2

canada

There is no offence known to Canadian law whose elements are met by merely experiencing satisfaction caused by someone else's offence.

Nor is there any path to party liability for an offence due to the experience of satisfaction caused by the principal's offence.

Answer 3

france

In France, the logic described by @ohwilleke also applies: some actus reus is required and none of your examples would make anyone an accomplice or accessory to the crime. There are however two charges that could still apply, at least to examples 1 and 3. First, conspiracy charges (“association de malfaiteurs”) are very broad. The broadness of this offense has often been criticized and it was even removed from the books in 1983. It came back in 1986 (after a wave of terrorist attacks) and has been considerably hardened since.

This is especially the case for terrorism cases (“association de malfaiteurs en vue d'une entreprise terroriste”), where people have been charged for minor criminal conduct or knowing the perpetrator and being sympathetic to their ideology under the theory that the person “should have known” that someone is a dangerous terrorist who could potentially commit an attack. One case that comes very close from the constellation of facts you describe is Abdelkader Merah. The court of first instance ruled that there was no evidence he was involved in his brother's murders or aware of any specific acts but it did sentence him to 20 years in jail on the conspiracy charge based on his proximity to his brother and sympathy for the same ideology. This is explicitly distinct from being an accomplice (“complicité”), which is actually the verdict that led the appeals' court to increase Merah's sentence to 30 years.

The second charge that could be relevant is “apology”. Here again, it applies to many serious crimes but it is pursued especially aggressively for terrorism. It does not matter whether the perpetrator himself expected it or whether it played any role in his conduct, it is simply illegal to cheer on a violent crime. This is however a separate offense and does not make you an accomplice to the murders themselves or any other related charge. Another nuance is that merely experiencing satisfaction or sharing it privately does not raise to the level of an offense, it's only about expressing this sentiment publicly (so again it would apply to example 3 but maybe not to the broader conduct you have in mind).