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Say that judge Fern was the First to encounter a certain case where Law L could be considered relevant. Fern is more of a judicial activist and believes in an expansive interpretation of the law, so interprets L in a way that's borderline creating new law.

Later on, a case that's essentially exactly the same comes before judge Ted the textualist. One of the lawyers in the case argues to Ted that clear precedent has been set by Fern's ruling.

Is Ted obliged to honor Fern's precedent, or can he say "I don't agree with Fern's interpretation" and rule with respect to his own interpretation of L?

I'm especially interested in how Fern/Ted's standing as a judge matters. For example, if Fern was a Supreme Court justice, then I'm pretty sure Ted has no hope. On the other hand, if Fern was a lower-court judge and Ted was a Supreme Court justice, I'm sure Ted is totally fine. But what about the other cases, where Ted and Fern are distributed throughout the middle/lower courts, or even state supreme courts?

Lastly, If Fern and Ted rule differently, what does that mean for the litigants they presided over? Can Fern's litigants do something due to Ted's ruling, or vice versa?

Jen
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chausies
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2 Answers2

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Since Fern was the first judge to rule on this law, and assuming that Fern is a federal judge, Fern must be a district court judge. There is no binding precedent, therefore, and Ted is not bound to follow Fern's reasoning.

I'm especially interested in how Fern/Ted's standing as a judge matters. For example, if Fern was a Supreme Court justice, then I'm pretty sure Ted has no hope.

The judge's status doesn't matter; it is the identity of the court that matters. Appeals court judges may be designated to hold district court; district judges may be designated to appellate service. That does not change the precedential effect of the courts' rulings.

Precedential opinions of a circuit court of appeals only bind lower courts in that circuit. This can lead to different interpretations of the law having force in different parts of the country. Resolving such "circuit splits" is one of the factors that can motivate the supreme court to take a case.

If Fern and Ted rule differently, what does that mean for the litigants they presided over? Can Fern's litigants do something due to Ted's ruling, or vice versa?

The losing party in Fern's or Ted's case can appeal the ruling to the appropriate circuit court of appeals. If they argue that the judge's interpretation is incorrect, they can cite the other case in support of that argument. This is called "persuasive precedent" or (perhaps more precisely) "persuasive authority."

phoog
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Yes, trial courts can set precedent on questions of law. See generally R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 and Re Hansard Spruce Mills, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 590 (B.C.S.C.). Trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction are bound by the ordinary principles of horizontal stare decisis to follow prior judgments made by other trial judges of the same court (subject to limited exceptions). See Sullivan, paragraphs 44 and 75:

[44] A superior court judge in first instance [i.e. a trial court] should follow prior decisions made by their own court on all questions of law, including questions of constitutional law, unless one or more of the exceptions in Spruce Mills are met.

[75] The principle of judicial comity — that judges treat fellow judges’ decisions with courtesy and consideration — as well as the rule of law principles supporting stare decisis mean that prior decisions should be followed unless the Spruce Mills criteria are met. Correctly stated and applied, the Spruce Mills criteria strike the appropriate balance between the competing demands of certainty, correctness and the even-handed development of the law. Trial courts should only depart from binding decisions issued by a court of coordinate jurisdiction in three narrow circumstances:

  1. The rationale of an earlier decision has been undermined by subsequent appellate decisions;
  2. The earlier decision was reached per incuriam (“through carelessness” or “by inadvertence”); or
  3. The earlier decision was not fully considered, e.g. taken in exigent circumstances.

To be clear: courts of coordinate jurisdiction are bound as a matter of stare decisis unless one of the above exceptions are established:

[57] ... [the judge] was bound to follow precedent because as a matter of horizontal stare decisis, [the previous judgment] was binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction in the province as a matter of judicial comity, unless an exception to horizontal stare decisis was established.

Jen
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