It has been explained to me that it is impossible to prove or disprove a quantum interpretation because all quantum interpretations make the same predictions.
Is this accurate? Is there a seminal work proving this assertion? Are all possible predictions of QM known? If it's true by definition, then is it possible to prove absolutely that a proposed interpretation is an interpretation? Is it proven that QM alone is enough to describe the entire universe in entirety? And if not, couldn't there be a contradiction between an interpretation and something beyond, or emerging from QM?
Edit:
There have been some really interesting answers. I am surprised how divergent the thinking is on this subject. And that has made accepting an answer difficult. I thought I should take the opportunity to better convey the original questions now that I have the answers to relate them to.
(1) It seems that there is no generally agreed upon definition of an interpretation of a scientific theory, and, on top of that, the definitions people use, as they relate to QM, are further complicated by the strangeness of QM, and the long and complicated history of our progress in trying to understand it.
(2) It seems pragmatic (on the surface) to define what an interpretation of QM is by limiting interpretations, by definition, to make only the same predictions as QM does. However, it isn't clear to me how we can fully determine what predictions QM makes, and what predictions an interpretation of QM makes. To begin to approach this, you first need to approach the question of whether the theory of QM alone is enough to describe (in a formal mathematical sense), or generate, a given model of the universe. If that were accepted as an axiom, then you could approach the question of whether all observable manifestations of quantum systems are equivalent with respect to interpretation. Conversely, you could make the assumption that QM is not the complete causal picture to describe measurable reality. In this case, no matter how indirect, it would seem possible that a contradiction could arise between measurements and interpretations, without a contradiction arising between QM and the measurements. This question seems to be a problem for the domain of the formal sciences more so than the natural sciences.
However, the possibility of such a situation seems to only be taken half seriously, because QM and other theories in physics are typically assumed to be merely useful approximations, rather than true descriptions of reality itself. At least, we have no way to tell the difference through the scientific method. And in this view, contradictions between theories become moot.
On the other hand, logical consistency between multiple theories seems not entirely useless, since we can take that as a kind of evidence that there is likely to be unknown or hypothesized predictions that are strictly made jointly, by two or more theories together. For example, taking QM and GR together, and aiming for logical consistency, one may identify sets of testable predictions. Or further development of theories jointly consistent with a set of otherwise independent theories could be derived through formal sciences.
Despite this, ultimate observational limitations do make it impossible to determine what actually is consistent, since the unobservable, and uncomputable, could make anything possible (e.g. a simulation hypothesis). But, through formal mathematical methods, such as oracles, and the exploration of different sets of assumptions, one could explore many possibilities for consistent physical realities. To go from philosophy to theory of physics, you still need testability. But I'm not sure whether we know what is testable or not, for the same reasons described above.
Maybe this understanding (however flawed) can shed light on my questions and how they relate to one another, and the appropriateness or lack of appropriateness in referencing notions from formal science, in context.