State-specific answers are welcome.
Copyright is exclusively a matter of federal law*, and it in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to... copyrights .... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases.").
There are no state specific answers.
Has the constitutionality of working for hire been explored? I'm
looking for judicial opinions and case law.
There is no reasonable doubt that the work for hire doctrine is constitutional.
The "work for hire" doctrine arises from 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), which states:
Works Made for Hire.--In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Congress has broad discretion to decide who an "author" or "inventor" is under the clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution cited in the question. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 2020 case:
“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to
pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 212, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003).
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1511 (2020).
The annotations of court decisions interpreting that statute and interpreting the relevant clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, indicate that not a single case has ever even questioned the constitutionality of this part of the copyright statute, which was enacted in 1976 and took effect in 1978.
Also, contrary to the assumption made in the question, copyright laws that purely promote and protect rent seeking are constitutionally permitted. The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this question in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), holding that an extension of the term of copyrights still in force, even after the owners of those copyrights were dead, pursuant to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, was constitutional. See also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 318 (2012) ("The text of the Copyright Clause does not exclude application of copyright protection to works in the public domain.")
- There is one narrow exception to this exclusivity of federal law as of the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 in 1978:
With the 1971, 1976 and subsequent congressional amendments to the
federal Copyright Act, New York common-law protection of sound
recordings has been abrogated, but only in two respects. First, the
common law does not apply to any sound recording fixed, within the
meaning of the federal act, after February 15, 1972, because
recordings made after that date are eligible for federal statutory
copyright protection. Second, state common-law copyright protection is
no longer perpetual for sound recordings not covered by the federal
act (those fixed before February 15, 1972), because the federal act
mandates that any state common-law rights will cease on February 15,
2067. The musical recordings at issue in this case, created before February 15, 1972, are therefore entitled to copyright protection
under New York common law until the effective date of federal
preemption — February 15, 2067.
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 4 N.Y.3d 540 (2005) (interpreting the same treaty as Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012), in the context of state law protections for pre-1972 sound recordings).
Hat tip to @bdb484 in the comments.
