Facts directly pertinent to the question
A supervisor takes the case over from subordinate 1 at the arbitrator to not be compelled to admit that it failed to carry out its statutory and contractual duties to arbitrate as it lost so much time arguing over nothing, simply conspires with or compels subordinate 2 of her to fill out a new complaint in the name of Alice affixing Alice’s name to the complaint as though signed by Alice, and as a result of that, the subordinate 2 files a complaint anew with the arbitrator. (It is unknown whether or not any officer had knowledge of this decision, acts and omissions)
The filing includes one of a plethora of causes of action, the one arguably least plausible, and requiring the most technical knowledge of the matter; contends that only one cause of action is the entire basis of the filing of Alice on Alice’s behalf (while Alice named several ones), that Alice agrees to a telephone hearing of the matter while Alice specifically asked for a documents-only proceeding, and some other prominent differences are on the record between Alice’s actual filing and the document forged and filed on her behalf.
Alice receives a confirmation to her email address that they received her filing — the one filed by subordinate 2 under to supervision or as an agent of the supervisor in what appears to be a criminal enterprise.
The filing is rejected on the basis they had no jurisdiction; however, the decision may be entered into evidence during an actual court proceeding without further establishment per the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act which will create a strong presumption that Alice will have to overcome. It was reasonably suspectible that the decision subordinate 2 undersigned may be the basis of proceedings within the jurisdiction of federal departments or agencies (for e.g., Song-Beverly claims can be brought to federal court; allegations are within the jurisdiction of the NHTSA, and other federal agencies etc.) and therefor serious crimes were committed and, by all indications, conspired to be committed and committed as a result thereof.
The document recording the filing shows the same IP address as the origin of the filing computer as each email from subordinate 1 and 2 and their supervisor; it is clear on the face of it, that the filing was done by an individual with access to the arbitrators’ internal network (the filing occurred via their intranet instead of over the Internet) and further corroborating evidence that at least subordinate 2 and the supervisor are the perpetrators because ever since their filing, they ceased all communications while up until that point they in due course they replied emails, and failed to rectify or inform Alice of any investigation or any result thereof.
The arbitrator, both subordinates and the supervisor were located at the time in Texas; Alice in California.
Questions
Does Alice have a personal cause of action for any damages against the arbitrator, for e.g., on grounds of emotional distress, on the grounds of identity theft, or 18 U.S.C. § 371 to commit a violation of U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(A) against or at the detriment of behest of Alice?
Which state would have jurisdiction, California or Texas; or either at the choosing of Alice?
Does it matter that it is extremely difficult for Alice to part take in the proceeding in Texas? What if it is unreasonably difficult?
If a California statute was violated, can Alice sue on that basis in California or she would have to do that in Texas, too?
Small claims action
Reading another question, I found this interesting concept that “The European Small Claims procedure is designed to simplify and speed up cross-border claims of up to €5000”; is there something similar in U.S. disputes where the parties are in different states? Would Alice be allowed to files suit in California for any reasons founded in the above fact patterns in Small Claims court in California if a superior court would require her to file suit in Texas?
Secindary facts for more context
Alice is a buyer of a vehicle subject to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Her car is a lemon, and seeks relief with the non-binding arbitrator of the manufacturer of the car.
She send her complaint to the arbitrator with an armada of disclaimers excluding any change to the complaint without her signature.
The arbitrator is subject to federal and state law providing it only had 40 days of the date of filing to render an expeditious and fair decision. The arbitrator denies receipt on 12 moot grounds, and Alice objects to the violations of law and rules of arbitration to retain her rights during the proceedings. Her challenges are expressly and/or impliedly yielded to by the arbitrator who reduces its reservations to 2 issues, and eventually surrenders to one of the last two. 18 days passed, and the arbitrator failed to initiate the proceedings despite a complaint with several hundreds of pages of evidence.
Having retained her rights by the objections she made meant the arbitrator once admitting to the last unsubstantiated cause of rejection would have meant that the arbitrator should have started on the date of actual receipt, and they just shot themselves in the foot with what they wanted to use for their advantage to weaken the consumer’s, Alice’s case.
The arbitrator never received Alice's consent, express, implied or effective, in fact, Alice, at all times relevant to the question, ferociously objects to any attempts to compel her to consent to filing anew even to the extent to comply with the unsubstantiated causes for rejection.
