According to George W. Bush's Office of Legal Counsel, Valid
Per the Office of Legal Counsel, July 7, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT You have asked
whether, having decided to approve a bill, the President may sign it,
within the meaning of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, by
directing a subordinate to affix the President’s signature to it, for
example by autopen.This memorandum confirms and elaborates upon our
earlier advice that the President may sign a bill in this manner. See
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from M.
Edward Whelan III, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, Re: Signing of H.J. Res. 124 (Nov. 22, 2002)
(“Whelan Memorandum”). We emphasize that we are not suggesting that
the President may delegate the decision to approve and sign a bill,
only that, having made this decision, he may direct a subordinate to
affix the President’s signature to the bill.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: In Part I, we examine the legal
understanding of the word “sign” at the time the Constitution was
drafted and ratified and during the early years of the Republic.We
find that, pursuant to this understanding, a person may sign a
document by directing that his signature be affixed to it by another.
We then review opinions of the Attorney General and the Department of
Justice and find the same understanding reflected in opinions
addressing statutory signing requirements in a variety of
contexts.Reading the constitutional text in light of this established
legal understanding, we conclude that the President need not
personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a
bill to sign it within the meaning of Article I, Section 7.In Part II,
we consider the settled interpretation of the related provisions of
the same section of the Constitution that require that bills be
presented to the President and that the President return to Congress
bills he disapproves, and find that this interpretation confirms our
view of Article I, Section 7’s signing requirement. In Part III, we
consider practice and precedent relating to the constitutional signing
requirement and show that they do not foreclose our conclusion.