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While reading Probability and Statistics books related to Legal cases, I came across usages of two terms - Evidence and Information - that are a bit confusing to me. Specifically, while solving a numerical on a case R v Adams (1996) the term "evidence" is used to indicate the DNA traces recovered from the victim - which is understandable. However, I get confused when the DNA of the suspect is also termed as "evidence", but the alibi of the suspect is termed as "information". In fact, the identification failure (the victim did not pick the suspect in an identification parade) is also termed as "information".

Can anyone shed any insights on how to decide information vs evidence! Note that in this specific numerical, the propositions were source level (i.e., whether, or not the suspect is the source of the DNA trace recovered at the crime scene) -- not sure if this has anything to do with the distinction between 'evidence' and 'information'.

ohwilleke
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KRG
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1 Answers1

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The judgments you cite do not endorse or even refer to an information/evidence distinction.

The most relevant discussion comes in second appeal judgment, R. v. Adams [1997] EWCA Crim 2474, which strongly rejects an approach that would invite jurors to divide the material placed before them into categories of "evidence" and "information" to inform some sort of a Bayesian analysis about which they would need to be educated by an expert witness. It is all just evidence.

Of course, it is a matter for the jury how they set about their task, and it is no part of this court's function to prescribe the course which their deliberations should take. But consideration of this case along the lines indicated would in our judgment reflect a normal course for a properly instructed jury to adopt. It is the sort of task which juries perform every day, carefully and conscientiously, on the evidence, as they are sworn to do. We do not consider that they will be assisted in their task by reference to a very complex approach which they are unlikely to understand fully and even more unlikely to apply accurately, which we judge to be likely to confuse them and distract them from their consideration of the real questions on which they should seek to reach a unanimous conclusion. We are very clearly of opinion that in cases such as this, lacking special features absent here, expert evidence should not be admitted to induce juries to attach mathematical values to probabilities arising from non-scientific evidence adduced at the trial.

Jen
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