japan Truth is only a defense if the matter is of public interest!
We're dealing with crimes against the reputation of the victim, especially Art. 230, 230-2 and 231. Please note the parts I emphasized.
(Defamation)
Article 230 (1)A person who defames another person by making allegations in public, regardless of whether such facts are true or false, is punished by imprisonment or imprisonment without work for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than 500,000 yen.
(2)A person who defames a dead person is not punished unless such defamation is based on a false facts.
(Special Provision for Matters Concerning Public Interest)
Article 230-2 (1)When an act prescribed under paragraph (1) of the preceding Article is found to relate to matters of public interest and to have been conducted solely for the benefit of the public, the truth or falsity of the alleged facts are to be examined, and punishment is not imposed if they are proven to be true.
(2)In application of the preceding paragraph, matters concerning the criminal act of a person who has not been prosecuted is deemed to be matters of public interest.
(3)When the act prescribed under paragraph (1) of the preceding Article is made with regard to matters concerning a public employee or a candidate for election, punishment is not imposed if an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the alleged facts are made and they are proven to be true.
(Insults)
Article 231 A person who insults another person in public, irrespective of whether the accusation alleges facts or not, the person is punished by penal detention or a petty fine.
See, "truth" is not a defense for defamation in Japan unless the statement is true, of public interest, and soley for the benefit of the public. As Rebecca R Carlson put it in her Essay for the Washington International Law Review after translating the court opinion in "Kawakami v. Sakurai" (again, emphasis mine):
In Japan, in a defamation case involving a matter of public interest, once the plaintiff establishes injury to reputation (or more accurately, honor), the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the truth of the statement, or adequate reason to believe the truth of the statement at the time of publication.
So the first prong to even be allowed to raise the defense of "truth" is to be a matter of public interest. The case "Kawakami v. Sakurai" concerned the distribution of HIV-contaminated blood, which to US or European eyes undoubtedly would be a matter of public interest, and can serve as a good example of what is and isn't in the eye of Japanese courts.
so, before we can further look at the various statements and see which laws were violated we need to check if we have a public interest applying. For the start, let's assume that Alice is a normal citizen and not a person of heightened public interest (e.g. rockstar, politician, business leader etc.) or in a position of public trust (e.g. police, city clerk). None of the acts alleged by Bob are criminal, so 230-2(2) can not be satisfied, and because we assumed she's not a politician (and thus not a candidate) or (trusted) public employee, 230-2(3) also doesn't apply.
Stars and idols are somewhat harder to put on that public interest standard, as the Kitagawa abuse scandal shows. It depends very much on the alleged acts. In the mentioned case, claiming to make people under the drinking age smoke and drink was deemed to be defamatory in the Tokyo High Court, but the same judgment also ruled that Kitagawa did engage in sexual exploitation, and those reported parts were not defamatory. So this is a very delicate balancing act if something is private or of public interest, and the courts often seem to lean on the "private matter" side, as Carlson put it (about the HIV-Blood case):
Kawakami v. Sakurai also illustrates the potentially tenuous or limited nature of freedom of the press in Japan. “Harsh” critical journalism is comparatively uncommon in Japan, and commentators have argued that this may be a result of the legal standards on defamation. The Supreme Court did not use the broader constitutional rights of freedom of press and freedom of conscience to justify the statements of opinion in its analysis. Instead, the fight to justify such statements was arduous, and victory was uncertain: Sakurai lost at the appellate level on the exact same legal test she won on in the Supreme Court. Seen from this perspective, Kawakami v. Sakurai raises doubts as to whether Japanese defamation law alone adequately protects journalists who criticize distinguished members of the public.
In any case, as long as Alice is not a widely known person, it pretty much dooms any inquiry if 230-2 is applicable to fail.
Individual statements
Statement 1 is clearly a violation of both 231 and 230. 230-2's exception does not apply as the public does not benefit from knowing details about Alice's sexual preferences and the statement is made for revenge purposes. Statement 2 is (in the clinical manner presented) not an insult, and not defamatory, so neither 230 nor 231 apply in this presentation but might very well depending on how the actual act happened. I will come back to this statement later for another purpose. Statement 3 is a defamatory insult, and does not satisfy the exception in 230-2 (see above), so both 230 and 231 could be charged. Statement 4 is only a violation of 230, as it is not an insult as presented, the 5th line is not a statement, so I analyze it separately below, and Statement 6 could be either or both, depending on the content and form the statement takes.
Recovery under the civil code for Statement 2?
Revealing the sexual orientation of a person is hard to palace in any category by itself, and unless formulated as insult or defamation, might not be a crime. The "act on protection of personal information" is only partially enforced in the first place and only applicable to business and government handling of such data, and so can't apply to Bob.
As a way out, the Civil Code provides a fallback with Article 709 & 710 that might be applicable if well plead that the revelation did alter or change the reputation of Alice unfavorably. These sections also provide a way to get compensation for all other statements above, so Alice might be made whole again, in addition to the fines (to the government) or confinement Bob faces.
(Compensation for Loss or Damage in Torts)
Article 709 A person that has intentionally or negligently infringed the rights or legally protected interests of another person is liable to compensate for damage resulting in consequence.
(Compensation for Loss or Damage Other than of Property)
Article 710A person liable for compensation for loss or damage pursuant to the provisions of the preceding Article must also compensate for loss or damage other than of property, regardless of whether that person infringed the body, liberty or reputation of another person, or infringed property rights of another person.
Line 5 - Compulsion
Line 5 is special, as it is not a statement, it is a different crime: extortion under Penal Code Article 249 is not applicable as that requires a monetary or physical gain from the victim. However it is an act of attempted compulsion under Penal Code article 223, which is how the Japanese Penal Code translates what is more commonly called coercion in the US or Europe (emphasis mine):
(Compulsion)
Article 223 (1) A person who intimidates another person using threat to harm the life, body, freedom, reputation or property of another person or by assault, causing the other person to perform an act which the person had no obligation to perform, or hinders the other person from exercising their own rights, is punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years.
(2)The same applies to a person who intimidates another person, using threat to harm the life, body, freedom, reputation or property of the relatives of the other person, causing the person to perform an act which the person has no obligation to perform, or hinders the person from exercising their rights.
(3)Any attempt to commit the crimes prescribed under the preceding two paragraphs is punished
united-states Truth Is an Absolute Defense!
Instead of going into a foray of all the various US jurisdictions, I do a short summary and then provide a few links to other questions that share enough details so they might inform about the vastly different standard applied here.
Cornell Law School summarizes the outline of what is generally defamation in the US (emphasis mine):
To prove prima facie defamation, a plaintiff must show four things:
1 a false statement purporting to be fact;
2 publication or communication of that statement to a third person;
3 fault amounting to at least negligence ; and
4 damages , or some harm caused to the reputation of the person or entity who is the subject of the statement.
For people of public interest the requirement of actual falsity shifts under The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to "actual Malice". Actual Malice is not the attitude to the defamed person, but actual malice to the truth, and is the legalese shorthand for "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not". Further the plaintiff (the one defamed) has a heightened burdon of proof ("clear and convincing") than with normal defamation ("preponderance of the evidence") in these cases.
In General, the US regards truth as an absolute defense.
Further reading:
